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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
 
Summary 
 
 The Court determined whether the “substantial-and-bona-fide-dispute” requirement under 
NRS 50.315(6) violated the Confrontation Clause, given the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts. 
 
Disposition 
 
 In light of Melendez-Diaz, the requirement of NRS 50.315(6)—that a defendant must 
establish a substantial and bona fide dispute regarding the facts in a declaration made and offered 
as evidence pursuant to NRS 50.315(4)—impermissibly burdens the right to confrontation. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 The City of Reno (City) charged Cheryl Lee with misdemeanor driving under the 
influence in Reno Municipal Court. The City sought to introduce into evidence the declaration of 
the phlebotomist who collected Lee’s blood for evidentiary testing. Lee objected to the 
admission of the declaration on Confrontation Clause grounds, and the municipal court sustained 
the objection. Subsequently, the City petitioned the district court for a writ of mandamus to 
compel the municipal court to admit the declaration into evidence. The district court denied the 
petition, stating that such an admission would have violated Lee’s rights under the Confrontation 
Clause. The City then appealed. 
 
Discussion 
 
This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal. 
 
 This Court has jurisdiction to review orders granting or refusing to grant mandamus 
pursuant to NRS 2.090(2). Furthermore, the Court may hear an appeal from a final judgment 
entered in an action commenced in the court in which judgment is rendered pursuant to NRAP 
3A(b)(1). In matters where the only issue is a petition for writ of mandamus, a district court’s 
order denying the petition constitutes a “final judgment within the meaning of NRAP 3A(b)(1).”2 
As the City’s petition was the only issue before the district court, this Court has jurisdiction to 
hear the appeal. 
 
The declaration is testimonial. 
 
 The Confrontation Clause states that “the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him.”3 Under this clause, testimonial hearsay against a 
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criminal defendant is prohibited unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior 
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.4 This Court has previously held that declarations 
made and offered pursuant to NRS 50.315(4) are testimonial hearsay.5 
 NRS 50.315(4) allows a declaration made under penalty of perjury by a person who 
collects blood from a subject for evidentiary testing to be admitted to prove (1) the declarant’s 
occupation, (2) the identity of the subject, and (3) that the declarant kept the sample in his 
custody until delivering it to another identified person. The parties do not dispute that the 
declaration at issue was testimonial hearsay under NRS 50.315(4). As the record does not 
suggest that the phlebotomist was unavailable, or that Lee had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine the phlebotomist, the declaration must be excluded unless Lee validly waived her 
confrontation rights. 
 
NRS 50.315(6) impermissibly burdens confrontation rights. 
 
 The City argued that Lee validly waived her right to confront the phlebotomist by failing 
to show a substantial and bona fide dispute regarding the declaration under NRS 50.315(6). Lee 
argued that the statute impermissibly burdened her right to confront her accusers, and that the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Melendez-Diaz compelled this Court to overrule its prior 
decision in City of Las Vegas v. Walsh.  
 A criminal defendant may waive his or her confrontation rights by failing to raise a 
proper objection. Under Nevada law, a defendant waives the right to confront an NRS 50.315(4) 
declarant if they fail “to argue that a substantial and bona fide dispute exists regarding the 
affidavit or declaration of the phlebotomist who drew the defendant’s blood.”6   
 In Melendez-Diaz, the U.S. Supreme Court considered a statute that allowed reports of 
forensic analysis to be admitted into evidence without requiring the prosecution to call the 
analysts as witnesses, but rather allowing defendants to subpoena the analysts. Because the 
statute “shift[ed] the consequences of adverse-witness no-shows from the State to the accused,” 
it was struck down.7 Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause 
puts the burden on the prosecution to present its witnesses, not on the defendant to bring those 
adverse witnesses into court.  
 The City argued that NRS 50.315(6) was a procedural rule, analogous to accepted 
“notice-and-demand” statutes that require a timely objection to the admission of testimonial 
hearsay. Lee argued that the statute placed the burden on defendants to establish a substantial and 
bona fide dispute, contrary to U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Melendez-Diaz. Although the 
constitutionality of NRS 50.315(6) was settled in Walsh, Walsh was decided before Melendez-
Diaz, so the Court revisited the issue. 
 The Court took notice of a similar issue that had arisen in Kansas. Under Kansas law, a 
defendant had 14 days to object to the admission of a certificate of a person who collected blood 
for analysis, and the defendant had to state the grounds for the objection (i.e., the defendant had 
to show that the conclusions of the certificate would be contested at trial).8 The Kansas Supreme 
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Court held that, in light of Melendez-Diaz, the statute was unconstitutional, because an objection 
based solely on the Confrontation Clause could not satisfy the requirements of the statute.9 
 The Court found the requirements of NRS 50.315(6) and the Kansas statute “substantially 
similar.” As both statutes imposed “additional requirements” beyond requiring a defendant’s 
timely objection to proffered evidence, the statutes were not analogous to the approved of 
“notice-and-demand” statutes in Melendez-Diaz. Therefore, since a defendant is forced to waive 
his confrontation rights if he cannot meet the additional burden of showing a substantial and 
bona fide dispute, the Court held that NRS 50.315(6) violates the Confrontation Clause. While 
the Court acknowledged that prior caselaw should not be overruled absent a “compelling 
reason,” the additional guidance provided by the U.S. Supreme Court in Melendez-Diaz gave rise 
to a compelling reason to overrule Walsh. 
 
The nature of the declaration does not alter confrontation rights. 
 
 The City argued that Melendez-Diaz is inapplicable to this case because here (1) the 
phlebotomist’s task of collecting blood was relatively simple, and (2) the facts supported by the 
declaration were merely foundational. 
 The Court rejected these distinctions. With respect to the first argument, the Court stated 
that the Confrontation Clause is not concerned with reliability of evidence, but rather, with the 
manner in which reliability is tested (through the “crucible of cross-examination”). Thus, 
simplicity and reliability are not relevant to a Confrontation Clause analysis, and the fact that 
collecting blood was a simple task had no effect on the defendant’s confrontation rights. With 
respect to the second argument, the Court stated that because the declaration was testimonial 
hearsay, the Confrontation Clause applied, regardless of whether the evidence at issue was 
“foundational.” Therefore, even if the declaration was only being used to show that the 
phlebotomist was, in fact, a phlebotomist, it was still a declaration by a witness “against” Lee, 
because the City sought to use the declaration to prove its case.  
 However, the Court noted that not every person “with any connection to physical 
evidence” had to testify. Although the City argued that the phlebotomist was “merely a person 
with some connection to Lee’s blood sample,” and thus was not required to testify, the City 
relied on caselaw where no testimonial statement was at issue. Thus, the Court rejected the 
argument, stating that the fact the declaration was only offered to lay the foundation for other 
evidence “has no effect on its testimonial nature, and therefore has no effect on the rights 
provided by the Confrontation Clause.”  
   
Conclusion 
 
 In light of Melendez-Diaz, the requirement of NRS 50.325(6)—that a defendant must 
establish a substantial and bona fide dispute regarding the facts in a declaration made and offered 
as evidence pursuant to NRS 50.315(4)—impermissibly burdens the right to confrontation, and 
thus Walsh is overruled. The simplicity of collecting blood and the foundational purpose for 
which the declaration was offered are irrelevant. Therefore, the district court did not err when it 
determined that the admission of the declaration would have violated Lee’s right to 
confrontation, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the City’s petition for 
a writ of mandamus.  
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